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Private Injuries, Public Policies:
Adjusting the NLRB’s Approach to Backpay Remedies
James J. Brudney

*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Symposium theme of re-engineering the National Labor Relations
Board encompasses two propositions. First, the National Labor Relations
1
Act (NLRA or Act) is in dire need of reform. After decades of congressional gridlock, however, the prospects for passage of the Employee Free
2
Choice Act are at best uncertain. And even if this major bill is enacted in
the form it was introduced, numerous labor relations challenges under the
3
NLRA would remain unaddressed. Meanwhile, the Labor Board continues
to administer the Act, too often operating at depleted strength and periodically censured as isolated and politicized, or as not sufficiently engaged
4
with the complexities and challenges of the modern workplace.
*
James J. Brudney is the Newton D. Baker-Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law at The Ohio State
University Moritz College of Law. Professor Brudney is grateful to Aaron Cornell and Melanie Oberlin
for superb research assistance and to Jennifer Pursell for excellent secretarial support. Elizabeth Kilpatrick, John Ferguson, and others at the NLRB furnished essential data on backpay claims as well as
invaluable information on Board practices. Marshall Babson provided helpful critical feedback at the
Symposium held at Florida International University College of Law in Miami in March of 2010. The
arguments and proposals in this article do not in any way reflect the views or preferences of current or
former Board personnel. The author states that errors of commission or omission are his alone. The
Ohio State University Moritz College of Law contributed generous financial assistance.
1
National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006)).
2
See Employee Free Choice Act, S. 560, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009).
3
See, e.g., Re-Empowerment of Skilled and Professional Employees and Construction Tradeworkers Act, S. 969, 110th Cong. (2007) (proposing to amend NLRA definition of supervisor); Employee Misclassification Prevention Act, S. 3648, 110th Cong. (2008) (creating special penalty for employers
who misclassify employees as non-employees); H.R. 3408, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing to close tax
code loophole on employer classification of workers); S. 2882, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing to close
tax code loophole on employer classification of workers).
4
In terms of operating at depleted strength, the Board was initially reduced to two members
from November 1993 to January 1994, then, again from December 2001 to January 2002, and for several days in August 2005. Most recently, it operated with only two members from December 2007 to
April 2010, a period of more than two years. See Brief for NLRB at 4-6, New Process Steel, L.P. v.
NLRB, No. 08-1457, slip op. (U.S. June 17, 2010). Regarding the Board’s failure to keep pace with
dynamic change in the American workplace, see, for example, James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L. POL’Y J. 221 (2005); Cynthia L. Estlund, The
Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1533-38 (2002); Wilma Liebman,
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Hence the second proposition: quite apart from what Congress may be
able to accomplish, the Labor Board can and should do more to vindicate
the Act’s purposes and policies and thereby to fulfill its own statutory mission. This Article embraces the second proposition. Its focus is the nature
of backpay awards as shaped by the Supreme Court decision in Phelps
5
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB. Its point of departure is the forceful narrative, written by an experienced Board field attorney, recounting the grim experiences
6
endured by forty-four Orlando hotel workers. Although the Board determined that the forty-four employees had been discriminatorily discharged
in 1996, the workers waited some thirteen years after their firings to receive
7
any back wages. Many of these men and women – and even their surviving children – endured grueling cross-examination about their interim work
histories from the attorney for the lawbreaker employer. Numerous fired
workers also had their wage claims reduced at the end of the day for failure
to mitigate during some portion of the prolonged post-discharge period.
The circumstances of the Orlando hotel case are extreme, but the
extended periods of delay in litigated backpay proceedings are not. Using
data for fiscal years 2004-2008 provided by the NLRB, I was able to
identify the average time periods from wrongful discharge to receipt of
backpay owed for the principal categories of meritorious cases that were
resolved through litigation and also for the main categories of meritorious
8
cases that were settled. The average period for litigated cases is almost
five years when the case reaches a Board decision, and over seven years
when the case progresses to an appellate court judgment. For settled disputes, the time period is considerably less but hardly trivial given that so
many discharges occur during organizing campaigns – nine months for
settlements reached without the Board’s direct involvement, and more than
9
eighteen months for settlements in which the Board is a participant.
From fiscal years 2004-2008, over 135,000 employees received backpay as victims of employer discrimination, mostly based on unlawful
10
discharges.
These workers were compensated under a private injuryDecline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of the National Labor Relations Board, 28
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569 (2007).
5
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
6
See Thomas Brudney, Victims on Trial? A Backpay Case at the NLRB, 5 FIU L. REV. 465.
7
As of February 2010, the discriminatees had not yet received all backpay they are owed.
8
As explained in Part II, roughly 80% of meritorious wrongful discharge claims under the Act
are settled. Of the litigated cases, about 9% of discharged claimants receive remedies following a Board
decision and another 10% receive them after an appellate court judgment. Non-meritorious wrongful
discharge claims were excluded from these data fields.
9
See infra Part II for presentation and discussion of findings.
10 See infra notes 74 and 91 (summarizing data from Board annual reports). The Board’s data
field on employees eligible for backpay does not separate discharges from other forms of pay-related
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reparative loss approach, featuring a robust doctrine of mitigation, on which
the Board has relied for more than half a century. The reparative loss
framework derives from Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion in Phelps
11
Dodge. The General Counsel over many decades has developed a detailed
12
and elaborate set of backpay and mitigation guidelines, and recent Board
13
decisions have contributed to the complexity of these calculations. Backpay determination processes are often cumbersome and time-consuming to
apply: they effectively invite employers to reduce and delay monetary recoveries and, not coincidentally, they undermine the remaining employees’
interest in pursuing unionization and a collective bargaining relationship.
Working within the existing statutory setting, the Article first asks to
what extent the Board has the authority to adjust its approach toward backpay and mitigation. The answer, in short, is more than has previously been
understood. The majority opinion in Phelps Dodge relies heavily on the
Board’s expansive powers to remedy unlawful employer discrimination –
not only through the “limited function” of repairing private injuries but also
by acting “in a public capacity to give effect to” the law’s declared public
14
policies, including “safeguarding . . . the right of self-organization.”
Invoking the remedial authority found within section 10(c) and
embraced in Phelps Dodge, the Article then proposes that the Board act to
develop and defend a mandatory minimum backpay award. The proposal
calls for a two-tiered approach based on the substantial differences in processing time between successful backpay claims resolved through settlement and claims resolved following litigation. As explained in detail
discrimination such as suspensions or failures to promote. The vast majority of these backpay claimants
were unlawfully discharged. See Email from Elizabeth Kilpatrick to author (Feb. 21, 2010) (on file with
author). As described in Part II, my analyses focus on the portion of the data fields that assuredly consists only of discharge victims.
11 See Phelps Dodge v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197-200 (1941).
12 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., CASEHANDLING
MANUAL (PART THREE) COMPLIANCE PROCEEDINGS §§ 10536–10568 (covering fifty pages), §§ 10590–
10592 (covering six pages); GC Memo 09-01 (2009) (discussing guidelines to litigate what constitutes
reasonably diligent job searches and substantially equivalent employment); GC Memo 07-07 (2007)
(discussing how to seek compound interest on Board monetary remedies); GC Memo 98-4 (1998) (discussing time frames for pursuing compliance in backpay cases); OM 08-54 (2008) (discussing need for
victims to initiate diligent job search in early stages of case processing); OM Memo 08-47 (2008) (discussing time targets for obtaining compliance with Board orders awarding backpay); OM 99-79 (1999)
(discussing compensatory damages initiatives under certain circumstances).
13 See, e.g., St. George Warehouse, 351 N.L.R.B. 961 (2007) (requiring employee victims to
produce evidence that they searched for particular new jobs); Grosvenor Orlando Assocs., Ltd., 350
N.L.R.B. 1197 (2007) (requiring job search to start after two weeks, regardless of whether employees
are still engaged in picketing to get their old jobs back); Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. No.
118, 182 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1001 (May 31, 2007) (requiring proof that employee victims who are “salts”
would have worked for employer for entire backpay period after having been denied a job).
14 Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at 193.
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below, employees discharged as a result of unlawful employer discrimination should receive at least one calendar quarter of backpay, to be awarded
without regard to net loss or mitigation efforts. Unlawfully discharged
employees whose liability or backpay determination is litigated to the
Board or appellate court stages should receive at least one year of backpay,
again in unreduced form. This mandatory minimum remedy is modeled on
a similar longstanding approach adopted by the Board to address
employers’ failure to bargain in good faith over the effects of plant clos15
ings. The remedy proposed here – like the Board’s limited backpay order
to remedy bad faith bargaining violations – is meant to vindicate the Act’s
public policies. In this instance, such a highly visible, mandatory remedy
will help to restore and protect the exercise of section seven rights by
employees during the many months or years required to investigate and
then settle or litigate unlawful discharges.
The Article’s principal aim is to explain and justify a proposed mandatory minimum remedy. As part of rethinking aspects of the Board’s backpay approach, the Article also suggests that the Board revisit its internal
memoranda and guidance materials from a broader perspective by paying
more attention to how mitigation issues are addressed under Title VII and
the state unemployment insurance system. Such attention, combined with a
commitment of additional resources to backpay compliance issues, might
enable the Board to diminish the burden on victimized employees, minimize the time and effort required of regional office personnel, and reduce
the chances for manipulation or abuse of the system.
Part I examines Phelps Dodge and subsequent Supreme Court decisions, and explains why the Board has considerable leeway to pursue a
more proactive remedial approach in backpay cases. Part II presents
findings on average delay periods experienced by victims of wrongful discharge, and on how often employees receive less backpay than what the
Board determines is due to them. Part II then relies on these findings to
propose a two-tiered mandatory minimum award. Part II also briefly raises
other possibilities for reducing the burden on employees and the agency in
the backpay setting.

15 See Transmarine Navigation Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 389 (1968); Melody Toyota, 325 N.L.R.B.
846 (1988); Hartzheim Dodge, 354 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 187 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1105 (Oct. 30, 2009).
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II. RECALIBRATING THE DOCTRINE OF MITIGATION
The Promise of Phelps Dodge

A.

The NLRB stance on backpay issues stems to a considerable extent
from the Supreme Court decision in Phelps Dodge. It is worth recalling
that the majority opinion as a whole represented a triumph for the Board’s
remedial approach. Justice Frankfurter adopted an expansive view of
agency powers under section 10(c) of the NLRA, which directs the Board
“to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with
16
or without backpay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act.” As part of
its mandate to take affirmative action, the Court approved the Board’s remedial order that an employer may offer jobs to applicants who had been
discriminatorily refused employment even though these individuals had
17
never technically been “employees” of the employer. Further, the Court
endorsed the Board’s determination to reinstate discriminatorily discharged
employees to their former jobs even if in the interim they had obtained sub18
stantially equivalent employment with another employer.
As Justice Frankfurter made abundantly clear, the Board’s breadth of
remedial authority under section 10(c) is a function of Congress’s concern
that the agency always bear in mind “effectuat[ing] the policies of this
19
Act.” In determining that the Board could order initial hiring for victims
of discrimination, the majority opinion underscored the importance of neutralizing all anti-union employment practices, adding that “[a]ttainment of a
great national policy though expert administration in collaboration with
limited judicial review must not be confined within narrow canons for equitable relief deemed suitable by chancellors in ordinary private controver20
sies.” Justice Frankfurter was even more emphatic with respect to reinstatement of unlawfully discharged employees who had found equivalent
employment during the pendency of litigation. These are individuals whose
private injuries have been fully repaired in traditional equity terms. Yet as

16

29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
See Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at 187-89. The employer argued that the phrase “including reinstatement” in section 10(c) reflected Congress’s focus on already-hired employees, not job applicants.
See id. at 188-89.
18 See id. at 189-93. The definition of “employee” under the Act includes an individual whose
work has ceased because of an unfair labor practice “and who has not obtained any other regular and
substantially equivalent employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
19 See Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at 188 (invoking the Act’s policies to justify providing employment that was wrongfully denied to an applicant); id. at 191 (invoking “the central clue to the Board’s
powers – effectuation of the policies of the Act – and in that light appraising the relevance of a worker’s
having obtained ‘substantially equivalent employment’”).
20 Id. at 188.
17
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Frankfurter declared, “to deny the Board power to neutralize discrimination
merely because workers have obtained compensatory employment would
confine ‘the policies of this Act’ to the correction of private injuries. The
21
Board was not devised for such a limited function.” Reinstatement often
may not be necessary to repair a discharged worker’s loss viewed in ordinary economic terms. The majority insisted, however, that “to limit the
significance of discrimination merely to questions of monetary loss to
workers would thwart the central purpose of the Act, directed as that is
22
toward the achievement and maintenance of workers’ self-organization.”
The Court’s further determination that employees bear some responsibility to mitigate their wage losses must be understood in light of the decision’s major theme: construing Board remedies so as to vindicate the Act’s
public policies. In two paragraphs near the end of the majority opinion,
Justice Frankfurter observed that because backpay is intended to compensate for employees’ actual lost wages, “it seems fair that deductions should
be made not only for actual earnings by the worker but also for losses that
23
he willfully incurred.” The Board to this point had not required employees
24
25
to mitigate, and at least one circuit court had accepted its position.
Before the Supreme Court, the Board argued that applying the mitigation
26
doctrine would impose an undue administrative burden on the agency.
Justice Frankfurter dismissed the “excessive burdens” argument in a single

21

Id. at 192-93 (emphasis added).
Id. at 193 (emphasis added); see also id. (“[The Board] does not exist for the adjudication of
private rights; it acts in a public capacity to give effect to the declared public policy of the Act to eliminate and prevent obstructions to interstate commerce by encouraging collective bargaining.” (internal
citations omitted)). The Act since 1947 has added a right for workers to refrain from self-organization,
but the right to organize and engage in collective bargaining free from employer discrimination or
retaliation remains a core policy.
23 Id. at 198 (emphasis added).
24 See, e.g., N.Y. Handkerchief Mfg. Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 532, 559-60 (1939); Western Felt Works,
10 N.L.R.B. 407, 447, 449 (1938).
25 See NLRB v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99 F.2d 533, 538-39 (9th Cir. 1938) (holding that Board is
“empowered to restore to the employee both his job and the pay he lost, which would include the time to
reinstatement”); see also Aqwilines, Inc. v. NLRB, 87 F.2d 146, 150-51 (5th Cir. 1936) (stating that a
back pay order does not award “damages” but constitutes a “public reparation order” designed to further
the policy interests set forth in the Act). But cf. Subin v. NLRB, 112 F.2d 326, 331 (3d Cir. 1940)
(ordering reinstatement of laid off union supporter but not interim back pay “because by her own testimony her time following the layoff was largely occupied by family duties as a matter of her own
choice”).
26 See Brief for NLRB at 57, Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. 177 (Nos. 387, 641) (contending that “[w]e
do not believe it was the intent of Congress to preclude effective administration of the Act by requiring
the Board to dissipate its energies in time-consuming and speculative inquiries into earnings which were
not made but were arguably possible.”).
22
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sentence, asserting that the agency “overestimates administrative difficul27
ties and underestimates its administrative resourcefulness.”
Based on nearly six decades of hindsight, the Board was surely correct
in that it had not overestimated the administrative burdens accompanying a
mitigation doctrine. The agency’s current Compliance Casehandling
Manual includes detailed discussion of how Regional Office attorneys
28
should investigate and evaluate mitigation efforts.
This evaluation
requires an assessment of whether or to what extent there has been a failure
to mitigate based inter alia on inability to secure interim employment;
rejecting an offer of interim employment; voluntarily quitting interim
employment; being fired from interim employment; unavailability during
certain time periods or due to particular circumstances such as illness,
injury, pregnancy, military service, or attendance at an educational institu29
tion; and withdrawal from the labor market for certain time periods. Mitigation is often a central feature of backpay settlement discussions or
compliance litigation, and here too the Compliance Manual includes
30
specific instructions for regional attorneys. Apart from the Manual, there
are numerous memos from the General Counsel directly, or from the
Division of Operations-Management within the office of the General
Counsel, that amplify, supersede, and further specify regional office re31
quirements regarding mitigation. Board attorneys now expend enormous
resources on the mitigation issue – when preparing their case, during
settlement negotiations, and as part of compliance litigation.
On the other hand, Justice Frankfurter was surely correct when he
stated that the Board underestimated its own administrative resourcefulness.
Frankfurter made clear that “the Board has a wide discretion to keep the
[backpay] matter within reasonable bounds through flexible procedural
27 Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at 198. The Board’s brief had emphasized the difficulties it anticipated
if ordered to administer a mitigation doctrine. See Brief for NLRB, supra note 26, at 56-57 (arguing
that especially for cases “involving back pay accruing over a number of years to a large number of men,
it would be a tremendous task to ascertain, in each instance, the employment opportunities available in
the lines of work which each man was qualified to perform, and to inquire into the intensity and good
faith of the efforts made by each to support himself”).
28 See generally CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 12, §§ 10558, 10560, 10592.
29 See id. §§ 10558, 10558.1–.4, 10560, 10560.1–.2, .4–.6, .8.
30 See id. §§ 10592.6, 10648.4, 10648.6.
31 See, e.g., GC Memo 09-01 (2008) (discussing standards for litigating what constitutes a discriminatee’s reasonable job search and how to prove there were substantially equivalent available jobs);
GC Memos 02-06 (2006), 98-15 (1998), and 88-9 (1988) (setting forth backpay and reinstatement
policy where discriminatee’s legal status is disputed); OM Memo 09-16 (2008) (discussing what constitutes mitigation by paid union organizers (salts) who experienced job discrimination); OM Memo 08-54
(2008) (discussing time frame for discriminatees to initiate a reasonably diligent search for interim
complaint); OM Memo 99-79 (1999) (discussing possibility of supplementing backpay calculations with
some form of compensatory damages).
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devices.” In this regard, the majority opinion does not require that mitigation be applied in identical fashion to all groups of employees, or that a
discriminatee’s responsibility to mitigate attaches to every dollar of lost
wages. Importantly, the majority opinion nowhere suggests that the Act’s
public policy regarding unlawful discharges is fully vindicated if discriminatees are made whole for lost wages less what they reasonably could have
earned. Even within its two-paragraph discussion of the mitigation issue,
the opinion if anything implies just the opposite. Justice Frankfurter
reiterates the broad scope of the Board’s remedial discretion in backpay
situations: making workers whole for their lost wages is only “part of the
33
vindication of the public policy which the Board enforces.” In developing
its approach to backpay relief, the Board has a “freedom given to it by
34
Congress to attain just results in diverse, complicated situations.” And in
seeking those just results, the Board “may give appropriate weight to a
35
clearly unjustifiable refusal to take desirable new employment.”
Moreover, as previously discussed, these two paragraphs must be read
in the context of the majority opinion as a whole. The Board may give
“appropriate” (not conclusive) weight in the backpay setting to a discriminatee’s mitigation efforts. A victim’s diligence in searching for or accepting
interim employment is only one part of the Board’s remedial charge, which
ultimately involves vindicating the Act’s “central purpose: the achievement
36
and maintenance of workers’ self-organization.” When designing remedies for intentional employer misconduct in order to advance this central
purpose, the Board’s powers as expert agency are especially broad:
“Because the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence, courts must . . . guard against the danger of sliding
unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious do37
main of policy.”
Properly understood, Phelps Dodge leaves the Board with ample
authority to develop innovative backpay awards by acting “through flexible
38
procedural devices.” The touchstone for agency discretion is assuring
meaningful protection to those who were fired for speaking out on behalf of
self-organization and also to those not fired but predictably intimidated
after seeing what happened to their leaders and spokesmen. Just as failing
to reinstate wrongfully discharged union supporters who wish to return
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at 198 (emphasis added).
Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
Id. at 198 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 193.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 199.
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“would sanction a most effective way of defeating the right of self39
organization,” so too does failing to structure an adequate backpay remedy
for those same union supporters.
Some may object that such a close textual reading of Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion places undue weight on words and phrases now six
decades old. To be clear, I am not contending the Board may refuse
altogether to embark on a mitigation inquiry – the dissenting justices in
40
Phelps Dodge were rebuffed on that argument. Rather, my contention is
that the majority’s insistence on a mitigation inquiry still allows for considerable agency flexibility in how that inquiry may be integrated into the
41
mandate of section 10(c), which is to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Indeed, an unqualified or absolute approach to mitigation is in tension
with the NLRA’s core purpose as well as Phelps Dodge’s emphasis on
Board flexibility and discretion. In discriminatory discharge settings, the
Board presumably seeks to ensure that its remedial processes do not operate
to undermine or frustrate the strong public policy favoring redress of
injuries to section seven rights. These injuries often include the
discouragement or intimidation experienced by fired employees and by
other union supporters in the workplace when it takes many months or
years to receive backpay or reinstatement. Under these circumstances, the
Board retains flexibility to accommodate both the employees’ responsibility
to mitigate their economic losses and the employer’s responsibility to provide a meaningful level of recovery to those whose section seven rights
39

Id. at 193.
See id. at 206-07 (Murphy, Black, and Douglas, JJ., dissenting in part).
41 A contemporary perspective on Phelps Dodge also gives rise to a somewhat ironic thought
experiment. Assuming the issue of requiring mitigation under the NLRA were presented ab initio, it is
not at all clear that today’s textually oriented Court would rule in favor of such a requirement. The vote
on this issue was 4-3 in Phelps Dodge. The three dissenters noted that the Act makes no mention of a
need to consider mitigation, and they emphasized that this language gap should hardly be the basis for
judicial intervention to limit the remedial powers expressly vested in the Board under section 10(c).
When comparing the NLRA remedial provision with the remedial language in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, or in the Americans with Disabilities Act, it is apparent that Congress knows how to include
specific text requiring that discriminatees attempt to engage in mitigation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(2006) (Title VII) (stating that “interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the
person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce back pay otherwise allowable”); 42
U.S.C. § 12117(a) (ADA) (incorporating remedies set forth in § 2000e-5 for ADA use). And the modern
Court has famously relied on close textual analysis along with language canons to conclude that when
Congress omits a remedial element it has provided for in other statutes, the omission should be taken
seriously. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255-58 (1993) (holding that monetary
damages are not awardable as “appropriate equitable relief” under § 502 of ERISA); United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1992) (holding that “other [appropriate] equitable relief” under Title VII
precluded awards of compensatory or punitive damages prior to language change in 1991 amendments);
W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88-92 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (holding that expert fees are not
awardable as part of a “reasonable attorney’s fee” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
40
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have been violated. If the duty to mitigate applies without qualification
from the first dollar of backpay forward, then the costs associated with protecting section seven rights during organizing campaigns and collective
bargaining drives fall too heavily on the shoulders of victimized employees.
In order to address the daunting effects of discriminatory discharges on
employees who remain in the workplace and employees who have been
wrongfully terminated, a guaranteed minimum level of monetary recovery
seems appropriate.
In sum, under a fair reading of Phelps Dodge, the Board has not yet
done enough to justify Justice Frankfurter’s faith in its administrative
resourcefulness and in particular its capacity to develop flexible procedural
devices. The majority’s determination that the Board give “appropriate
weight” to an employee’s failure to mitigate should be combined with the
majority’s repeated declaration that all remedies – including backpay –
must effectuate the policies of the Act. The Board has periodically
expressed an awareness of its dormant remedial authority regarding backpay. The General Counsel recognized that backpay orders should do more
than repair out-of-pocket monetary losses: they “also effectuate the
purposes of the Act by discouraging [employers] from further unfair labor
practices and by assuring discriminatees that the Government is protecting
42
their rights under the Act.” One important way for backpay orders to
serve these ends is through a mandatory minimum award of one or more
calendar quarters, an approach that can then complement employees’ obligation to mitigate.
B.

The Court’s Subsequent Treatment of Phelps Dodge

Before examining the contours for a mandatory minimum backpay
award, it is important to understand how the Court has developed its Phelps
Dodge approach to backpay and mitigation in later decisions. The Court
has cited Phelps Dodge in ninety subsequent cases, and both its expansive
view of the Board’s overall remedial authority and the need to consider
discriminatee efforts at mitigation remain good law. At the same time,
many citations to the Phelps Dodge majority relate to non-backpay aspects
of the decision or are cursory in nature. Of the handful of Supreme Court
cases that discuss the Phelps Dodge remedial approach in any depth, two
decisions warrant attention in this setting.

42 CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 12, § 10536.1; see also OM Memo 99-79 at 1 ((emphasizing Board’s role under § 10(c) to include dissipation of the employer’s coercive conduct as part of its
remedial approach).
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The most important subsequent Court decision is NLRB v. Seven-Up
43
Bottling Co., decided in 1953. In Seven-Up Bottling, the only issue before
the Court was the Board’s method of computing backpay for acknowledged
victims of employer discrimination. Until 1950, the Board had calculated
backpay awards based on the entire period from discharge to offer of reinstatement, subject to deductions for interim earnings or losses willfully
incurred over that period. In an attempt better to effectuate the policies of
the Act, the Board in a 1950 decision had modified its backpay approach of
fifteen years so as to calculate lost wages based on each separate calendar
44
quarter. Writing for the Court once again, Justice Frankfurter upheld the
Board’s new framework; in doing so, he rejected the company’s argument
that a blanket rule applying the quarterly calculation method exceeded the
45
Board’s remedial powers.
Significantly, the Board had switched to calendar quarters in 1950
based on its conception of what would best remedy the effects of employer
discrimination apart from providing for the amounts of backpay actually
owed. During the usually-prolonged period from unlawful discharge to
offer of reinstatement, employees may at times secure interim jobs that pay
more than the jobs from which they were fired. Under a calculation
formula based on the entire backpay period, employers may therefore have
an incentive to delay reinstatement in order to reduce or even eliminate
46
their cumulative backpay liability. Additionally, employees who have
begun earning higher wages many months after discharge often feel compelled to waive their right to reinstatement in order to toll the backpay
period and prevent the continuing reduction of monies due to them from the
47
initial months or years when they earned far less. Both of these incentives
adversely affect the likelihood of reinstatement, and the Board had determined that this companion remedy is “one of the most effective measures . .
. for expunging the effects of unfair labor practices and maintaining indus48
trial peace.”
43

NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
See F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289 (1950), discussed in Seven-Up Bottling, 344 U.S. at
345, 347-48.
45 See 344 U.S. at 345-49.
46 See F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. at 291-92.
47 See id. at 292. For instance, assume an employee earned $20,000 annually when discharged,
then she earned $10,000 during her first year after the firing (based on a diligent job search) and $30,000
on a temporary job during her second year. Under the pre-Woolworth calculation formula, her employer
has an incentive to delay any reinstatement offer through extended litigation and appeals – if the period
before reinstatement lasts two years, all backpay liability will have been eliminated. The employee, on
the other hand, may feel compelled to waive her right to reinstatement shortly after she secures the
higher-paying temporary job, in order to preserve as much backpay award as possible.
48 Id.
44
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A number of key points emerge from the majority opinion endorsing
the Board’s determination to modify substantially its backpay approach.
First, Justice Frankfurter reaffirms the limited role that employee efforts to
mitigate should occupy in the Board’s backpay arsenal. Although the Board
“must have regard for considerations governing the mitigation of damages,”
its remedial powers under section 10(c) remain very broad. A backpay
order should stand “unless it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt
to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the
49
policies of the Act.”
Second, and relatedly, the Court declared that the agency’s major
remedial change was distinctly policy-driven. The Board had invoked its
cumulative experience over many years to promote more effectively the
Act’s basic purposes; it determined that a robust reinstatement option was
needed to eliminate as much as possible the ongoing effects of employer
50
discrimination. The Court made clear it had no business weighing the
Board’s policy considerations or any counterveiling arguments, nor did the
Board need to support its policy judgments with an empirical analysis of all
51
relevant factors. Rather, “the Board’s conclusions may express an intuition of experience which outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and
52
tangled impressions . . . and they are none the worse for it.”
Third, the quarterly calculation method endorsed by the majority was a
class-based or blanket approach. Justice Douglas in dissent agreed that the
Board has the power to adopt a new calculation formula, but he objected to
its rule-like application in all cases. His particular concern was that for a
discriminatory employer whose business and wage payments fluctuate from
one quarter to the next, discharged employees who secure an interim job
with steady wages will probably receive backpay awards in excess of what
53
they would have received had they not been discharged. The majority
understood this result, but concluded that the importance of expunging discriminatory effects justified some employees receiving more backpay than
they would have earned had they worked their “regular job.” In addition, as
Justice Minton pointed out in his separate dissent, the Board’s blanket
calendar-quarter approach also meant that in some instances “the employer
must pay more than he would have had to pay if he had had the employee’s

49 Seven-Up Bottling, 344 U.S. at 346-47 (quoting Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533,
540 (1943)).
50 See id. at 347.
51 See id. at 348.
52 Id. (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 349 (emphasizing, per Phelps Dodge, that “the
relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence”).
53 See id. at 352-53.
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54

services during the period.” Once again, the Court’s conclusion indicates
that the Board may decide to effectuate the purposes of the Act in a backpay
setting by prescribing a monetary award that exceeds the overall net effects,
after accounting for interim employment and a reasonably diligent job
search.
In the years since Seven-Up Bottling, the Court has continued to refer
to Phelps Dodge, recognizing the Board’s considerable discretion when it
commands affirmative action under the remedial scope of section 10(c). In
a 1961 decision, the Court emphasized the Board’s broad authority to order
affirmative relief “as a means of removing or avoiding the consequences of
violation where those consequences are of a kind to thwart the purposes of
55
the Act.” Fourteen years later, the Court in establishing the scope of backpay relief under Title VII noted that the civil rights statute’s make-whole
purpose derived from section 10(c) of the NLRA, under which making
workers whole for monetary losses they suffered due to unfair labor prac56
tices was “part of the vindication of the [Act’s] public policy.”
Apart from Seven-Up Bottling, the other post-Phelps Dodge decision
that deserves extended attention in this context is the 1984 case, Sure-Tan
57
Inc. v. NLRB. At first glance, Sure-Tan would appear to limit substantially
what the Board is able to accomplish through mandatory minimum backpay
remedies. The case involved whether undocumented immigrants who were
victims of employer discrimination could receive a six-month mandatory
backpay award. Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice O’Connor concluded
58
that the Board lacked authority to order this relief. Upon close reading,
however, it becomes clear that for several reasons the Sure-Tan decision
comports with the Phelps Dodge approach as explained earlier in this Part.
54

Id. at 355 (Justice Minton was joined in his dissent by Chief Justice Stone.).
Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961) (emphasis added)
(relying on Phelps Dodge). The Court in Local 60 held that the Board had exceeded its broad powers
because the Board’s remedy against the union – a compelled refund of dues and fees collected from
employee members – did not involve removing any “consequences of violation” and was therefore
punitive rather than remedial in nature. See id. at 655-56.
56 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975) (emphasis added) (relying on Phelps
Dodge); see also NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 n.28 (1957) (relying on
Phelps Dodge to emphasize that because Congress knew it could not “define the whole gamut of
remedies to effectuate [the Act’s] policies in an infinite variety of specific situations,” it left “the adaptation of means to end to the empiric process of administration” – committed to the Board with only
limited judicial review (internal citations omitted)).
57 Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
58 See id. at 899-901. The Court reversed the appellate court, which had expanded the Board
order by providing for minimum six months backpay. See id. at 899. Because the Board fully acquiesced in the appellate court remedy, the Supreme Court considered whether the mandatory minimum
backpay award was “within the Board’s own powers” on the instant record and concluded that it was
not. Id. at 899 n.11, 901.
55
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First, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion did not object to the concept of a mandatory minimum backpay award. Rather, the Court rejected
the appellate court’s mandate of six months backpay because it was based
on a wholly speculative assumption – that six months was the minimum
period discriminatees might reasonably have been employed before being
59
apprehended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The failure
to support an empirical assumption as to how long discriminatees who are
also undocumented immigrants would have gone undetected under a superseding national enforcement program administrated by a separate agency
does not speak to other empirical or policy justifications for mandatory
minimum backpay relief. In particular, the Court’s reasoning does not
address the prospect of providing minimum backpay awards to effectuate
the policies of section 10(c) by vindicating rights to organize for terminated
and surviving employees in general, or by deterring employers from committing unlawful discharges that undermine these rights.
In a related vein, the Sure-Tan majority invoked Phelps Dodge when
recognizing the basic legitimacy of backpay relief “as a means to restore
the situation as nearly as possible” to what it would have been but for the
60
employer’s discriminatory conduct. This sensitivity to the importance of
restoring the larger situation – not simply the net monetary losses – is
consistent with the concept of a mandatory minimum award that would
remove intimidation and restore confidence for both fired and surviving
employees.
Admittedly, the Court in Sure-Tan envisions a backpay remedy that
“expunge[s] only the actual, and not merely the speculative, consequences
61
of the unfair labor practices.” This, however, is where – unlike the record
in Sure-Tan – the Board can draw on ample support that discriminatory
firings and subsequent delays in the remediation process have had an enormously intimidating impact on core protected activities under the Act. The
Board is able to address these actual consequences of violation by
referencing its own cumulative expertise in investigating and adjudicating
hundreds of thousands of unlawful discharge cases – its “intuition of

59 See id. at 899 (quoting from lower court’s “six months is a reasonable assumption” analysis);
id. at 900 (observing that section 10(c) confers broad discretion but proposed remedy must “be tailored
to the unfair labor practice it is intended to address”); id. at 901 (concluding that six-month minimum
backpay award “in the total absence of record evidence . . . constitutes pure speculation and does not
comport with the general reparative policies of the NLRA”); see also id. at 909 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(defending appellate court’s six-month award as resting on a lower court estimate that includes a sufficient degree of precision).
60 Id. at 900 (emphasis added; internal citations omitted).
61 Id. (citing by analogy to Phelps Dodge).
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experience which . . . sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions.”
Courts have long respected the Board’s authoritative discretion to take remedial action based on its conclusions as to how reasonable employees
objectively would tend to respond to unlawful employer discrimination or
63
coercion.
In addition to its intuition of experience, the Board can refer to an
array of government and scholarly studies that confirm beyond doubt the
distinctly adverse effects on organizing campaigns of unlawful firings and
64
Pursuant to
extended delays in the resolution of meritorious claims.
Seven-Up Bottling’s approval of Board adjustments in formulating backpay
awards policy, the Board should invoke these studies as further justification
to establish a backpay mandatory minimum award. Part II below addresses
how to tailor the minimum award period based on the nature and magnitude
of delays associated with receipt of backpay awards.
A final observation regarding Sure-Tan involves Justice O’Connor’s
statement in a footnote that “to our knowledge, the Board itself has never
62

NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1953).
See, e.g., Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184-85 (1973) (invoking Board
reliance on its experience with respect to likely impact of unremedied unfair labor practices on a successor’s workforce); Phelps Dodge v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 193 (1941) (invoking Board knowledge of
industrial affairs in recognizing likely effects of refusals to reinstate on the organizing rights of remaining employees); Ne. Land Servs. Ltd. v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36, 43 (1st Cir. 2009) (relying on Board test
that employer’s workplace rule is unlawful if “employees would reasonably construe the language [of
the rule] to prohibit Section 7 activity”).
64 For evidence of intimidating consequences from unlawful discharges, see for example
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONCERNS REGARDING IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE CHARGES AGAINST
EMPLOYERS FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES (1982) (reporting diminished success for unions in campaigns during which employer discrimination occurred); William T. Dickens, The Effect of Company
Campaigns on Certification Elections: Law & Reality Once Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 560,
568-69 (1983) (reporting significant reduction in union support when employer takes action against prounion employees); Morris M. Kleiner, Intensity of Management Resistance: Understanding the Decline
of Unionization in the Private Sector, 22 J. LAB. RES. 519, 528-30 (2001) (same). In addition, see
RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 234-36 (1984) (summarizing
findings from six studies); Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and
First-Contract Campaigns: Implications for Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF
AMERICAN LABOR LAW 81 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds. 1994) (describing how studies actually underestimate negative impact from firings because they do not include the many campaigns that collapse
before an election once the employer has fired key union supporters); see also id. at 78-79 (reporting
that for 261 union elections occurring in 1986 and 1987, win rate declines from 50% if election is held
within sixty days of petition to 31% if election is held 61-180 days after petition, and observing that
delays “give employers a longer time period in which to campaign aggressively”); Myron Roomkin &
Richard N. Block, Case Processing Time and the Outcome of Representation Elections: Some Empirical
Evidence, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 75, 76, 88 -89 (reporting that for over 45,000 union elections studied,
win rate decreases steadily from 50% (if election is held less than one month after petition is filed) to
30% (if election occurs four to seven months after petition is filed), and suggesting that “delay gives
employers added opportunity to dissuade employees and increases the likelihood of turnover in the
workforce” thereby undermining unions’ efforts to retain employee support).
63
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attempted to impose a minimum backpay award that the employer must pay
regardless of the actual evidence as to such issues as an employee’s availa65
bility for work or his efforts to secure comparable interim employment.”
In fact, the Board by this time had established just such a mandatory minimum award in an effort to address an employer’s intentional failure to
66
bargain in violation of the Act. In Transmarine Navigation Corp., the
Board held that when an employer refuses to bargain over the effects of a
plant closing, the standard remedy includes a requirement that the employer
provide a minimum of two weeks backpay to all affected employees.
Although the Court was evidently unaware of this standard remedy, the
Transmarine backpay award had been endorsed by at least one circuit when
67
Sure-Tan was decided. Since 1986, it has been reaffirmed regularly by the
68
69
Board, and accepted by every circuit to consider its propriety.
The rationale for the Board’s minimum two-week backpay award
derives from the need to effectuate policies under section 10(c). An
employer’s unlawful failure to bargain over effects denies the employees
the opportunity to engage in the protected activity of bargaining at a time
before the plant closing when such activity “would have been
70
meaningful.” Given the time delays involved in establishing employer
liability, and the consequent impossibility of returning to the status quo
ante, the Board’s mandatory minimum award reflects “the principle that the
wrongdoer, rather than the victims of his wrongdoing, should bear the
71
consequences of his unlawful conduct.” As elaborated by the appellate
courts, the purpose of the limited backpay requirement “is not to punish, but
to create an incentive for the Company to bargain in good faith [which]
72
comports with the primary objective of the Act.” Thus, the aim of the
Board’s innovative Transmarine remedy is two-fold. It seeks to make employees whole for their losses, at least to a degree. But “more importantly,

65

Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 901 n.11 (emphasis added).
Transmarine Navigation Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 389 (1968).
67 See Yorke v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 1138, 1145 (7th Cir. 1983).
68 See, e.g., Hartzheim Dodge, Inc., 354 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 187 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1105 (Oct. 30,
2009); Melody Toyota, 325 N.L.R.B. 846 (1988). See generally CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note
12, § 10528.7.
69 See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 21 v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 418, 423-24 (9th Cir. 2009);
NLRB v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 432 F.3d 69, 72-73 (1st Cir. 2005); NLRB v. Waymouth Farms, Inc., 172
F.3d 598, 600 (8th Cir. 1999); see also NLRB v. Emsing’s Supermarket, Inc., 872 F.2d 1279, 1290-91
(7th Cir. 1989).
70 Transmarine, 170 N.L.R.B. at 389.
71 Id. (emphasis added) (citing to Phelps Dodge).
72 Yorke, 709 F.2d at 1145.
66
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[it is] designed to restore at least some economic inducement for an
73
employer to bargain as the law requires.”
In sum, Phelps Dodge and its progeny leave the Board with freedom to
develop remedies that will effectuate the policies of the Act. And
Transmarine reflects the Board’s ability to construct a mandatory minimum
backpay remedy appropriately focused on furthering those policies without
regard to the victimized employees’ efforts at mitigation. At the same time,
Sure-Tan’s caveat that such remedies should be tied to actual rather than
speculative consequences of violation provides an apt transition to considering backpay relief in response to discriminatory firings.
III. INCORPORATING A MANDATORY MINIMUM AWARD
INTO BACKPAY RELIEF
In order to justify a proposal for mandatory minimum backpay awards
in wrongful discharge cases, it is necessary to explain what actually happens when the NLRB attempts to secure disbursement of backpay as a remedial matter. The Labor Board collects a substantial amount of information with respect to remedial action undertaken in unfair labor practice
(ULP) proceedings. Table 4 in the Board’s Annual Report discloses the
74
number of employees receiving backpay in cases closed each fiscal year.
For fiscal years 2004-2008, over 135,000 employees received backpay from
75
their former or current employers as victims of unlawful discrimination. I
was interested in more detailed data for this 2004-08 period regarding delays in payment to unlawfully fired employees. I also wanted to explore
whether these discharge victims receive the full backpay amounts the Board
concludes are owed by their employers, and if not what is the extent of the
shortfall.

73

Emsing’s Supermarket, 872 F.2d at 1291.
See, e.g., 73 NLRB ANN. REP. tbl.4 (2008) (reporting that 17,204 employees received backpay
from employers in FY 2008); 71 NLRB ANN. REP. tbl.4 (2006) (reporting that 26,824 employees received backpay from employers in FY 2006); 69 NLRB ANN. REP. tbl. 4 (2004) (reporting that 30,784
employees received backpay from employers in FY 2004). In addition to lost wages, the Board’s net
backpay remedy may also include nonwage benefits of employment such as expenses due to the loss of
medical insurance, or lost contributions to pension funds. See CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 12,
§ 10544. The instant mandatory minimum proposal focuses only on lost wages.
75 During the same five year period, some 1900 employees received backpay from unions for
unlawful practices. See infra note 131. Thus, employers’ discriminatory conduct accounts for 99% of
the employees receiving backpay relief. Because the raw number and proportion of backpay recipients
is so overwhelmingly tilted toward unlawful conduct by employers, they are the focus of this proposal.
However, as noted infra Part II.C.2. I suggest that some version of the proposal might apply to union
wrongdoers as well.
74
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In this Part, I first discuss the process of assembling a database, including background on the Board’s approach to classifying backpay cases.
I then present my findings, focused primarily on average periods of delay in
receiving backpay and on the proportion of employees who receive less
than what they are owed. Next, I explain how these findings support a twotiered mandatory minimum backpay award that distinguishes between settled and litigated cases. As part of the discussion, I consider concerns that
might be raised regarding my proposal.
A.

Assembling a Database

The Board collects and records time-specific developments in meritorious ULP cases that involve backpay and/or reinstatement, starting from
the date a charge was filed. For each charge that results in the Board prevailing (in whole or in part), additional data include the date a complaint
issued plus dates for all decisions by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ),
the Board, or a court of appeals. Each successfully resolved charge also
includes an entry for the date a closed case report (CCR) is filed.
The CCR is typically completed by the Regional Office trial attorney
or board agent who has primary responsibility for overseeing the case, or by
the Regional Compliance Officer. It is not filed until remedies have
actually been received by the affected employees. These remedies include
inter alia posting of notices, implementation of reinstatement, and disbursement of backpay. Monetary relief is almost invariably the most contentious item, taking the longest to resolve, and the General Counsel’s
Compliance Manual is explicit about the CCR being held in abeyance until
76
disbursement of backpay.
Based on discussion with staff from the
Division of Operations-Management, I determined to use the CCR date as
77
the presumptive date on which employees received their backpay.
1. Resolving Meritorious Backpay Claims:
Six Approaches
Although all successful backpay claims have a charge and a CCR,
there is considerable variation regarding intermediate stages. In the backpay setting, the Board records six distinct approaches to resolving
76 See, e.g., CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 12, § 10594.11. See generally id. § 10576.2
(describing standard procedures for disbursement of backpay); id. § 10592.12 (describing procedures for
accepting backpay in installment payments).
77 With respect to non-Board adjustments, defined below, the Regional Office may file a CCR
after approving withdrawal of a potentially meritorious charge, conditioned on the charged party fulfilling its privately negotiated obligations. See CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 12, §§ 10120.5,
10142.3; see also infra note 79.
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meritorious cases. Three resolutions are by means of negotiated agreement:
non-Board adjustments, informal Board settlements, and formal Board settlements. The other three involve compliance with an adjudicated decision:
by an ALJ, by the Board, or by an appellate court. In summarizing each of
the six approaches, I also explain why only four of the six are of conse78
quence for my purposes.
A non-Board adjustment is a private agreement between the employer
and affected employees or their union. It is usually reached before an adjudicated determination on the merits, although it may occasionally be negotiated following a Board or ALJ decision. Because the General Counsel is
not a party to non-Board adjustments, the agency is not in a position to
79
enforce them. At the same time, the Regional Office does process the
charge and investigate the merits; accordingly, the charging party may
withdraw the case only if the Regional Office agrees that the adjustment is
not repugnant to public policy. The Board has adopted an informal 80%
rule with respect to backpay cases. If a proposed settlement provides that
employees will receive less than 80% of what is due and owed to them, the
Regional Office may approve the non-Board adjustment (or sign off on an
informal Board settlement, as explained below) only after submitting it to
80
Washington.
For the five-year period being examined, non-Board adjustments covered about 43% of all successful charges involving backpay,
and roughly 33% of all employees receiving backpay.
An informal Board settlement is an agreement approved by the
General Counsel. Typically, the Regional Office has completed a merits
determination before issuing a complaint; the Office communicates this to
81
the parties and allows them a chance to enter into an agreement. The
informal settlement is so named because Board members are not formal
parties to the agreement. However, the General Counsel is a party (usually

78 The description of these six approaches – contained in the following six paragraphs of text – is
based on conversations with Operations Management and Regional Office personnel, and review of the
General Counsel Compliance Casehandling Manual. The proportion of charges and affected employees
covered under each approach was gleaned from data furnished by the Division of OperationsManagement, with invaluable analysis and insights from my research assistant, Aaron Cornell, Moritz
College of Law, Class of 2011.
79 If the settlement is breached, the Board may be able to reopen the case to address the particular
circumstances. See CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 12, § 10123.3.
80 See CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 12, §§ 10592.4, 11752. In applying this 80% rule,
what the Regional Office calculates as due and owing takes account of both interim earnings and the
duty to mitigate.
81 The same 80% rule applies as was true for non-Board adjustments. This 80% rule is not supposed to trigger an automatic reduction to 80% of the backpay amounts due. In practice, however, many
private attorneys believe the rule signals a willingness to accept up to 20% reductions, and this can make
it more difficult for the Regional Office to secure 100% of the amount owed.
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through the Regional Office), and accordingly the agency may be in a position to enforce the agreement if slippage occurs. Still, there is no court
approval of an informal settlement so enforcement through contempt action
is not available. From 2004 to 2008, informal settlements covered roughly
41% of all successful backpay charges and about 47% of affected
employees.
Together these first two types of settlements encompass over 80% of
82
charges and 80% of affected employees. The third settlement approach,
formal Board settlement, involves a court-approved agreement with Board
members as actual parties. Because a court is involved, the settlement is
enforceable through a contempt action. These formal settlements are
exceedingly rare; they cover less than one percent of charges and of
affected employees during the five year period.
Turning to the three distinct litigation approaches, compliance with
ALJ decision is by far the rarest, covering well under one percent of charges
and affected employees. Although a substantial number of ALJ decisions
address employers’ backpay liability and some address disputes over the
amount owed, it is extremely unlikely that the case will end at the ALJ
level. Many of these litigated cases are appealed to the Board; even when
the ALJ result is not contested, it is almost always formally approved or
83
adopted by the Board in a period of weeks or months.
Compliance with a Board decision occurs when the employer implements the backpay and reinstatement terms contained in the Board’s
decision, including terms incorporated from the ALJ decision. The CCR
date may not closely follow the Board decision date if for whatever reason
it takes time for payments to be disbursed. From 2004 to 2008, compliance
with Board decisions covered about 8% of charges and 9% of affected em84
ployees.
Finally, compliance with a court judgment refers to employer implementation of backpay and reinstatement terms as resolved by a reviewing
court of appeals or, on rare occasions, the Supreme Court. The reviewing
court may reduce or otherwise modify Board-ordered remedies including
the amount of backpay owed. This category of litigated resolutions covered

82 Exact percentages are 84% of successful backpay charges (43 + 41) and 80% of affected
employees (33 + 47).
83 See generally NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 101.11 (2009).
84 Board decisions under this heading are predominantly unfair labor practice decisions, but they
also include compliance decisions addressing contested backpay amounts. Of the 316 charges giving
rise to Board decisions in this five-year period, only twenty-four (7.6%) resulted in compliance decisions.
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about 7% of charges and 10% of affected employees. Thus, the two main
litigation categories encompass 15% of charges and roughly 20% of
affected employees during our five-year period.
As previously noted, the CCR date follows behind each of these six
types of charge resolution. The report may be filed only a few weeks or
months after the settlement or adjudication, but the process sometimes takes
years. There may be negotiations or contests over the reasonableness of the
employees’ efforts to mitigate, or over an employer’s asserted inability to
make timely payments, the implications of an employer’s bankrupt or
debtor status, or an employer’s bad faith intransigence. On occasion, the
Board may be a contributing source of delay due to inadequate communication between the Regional Office and Washington or to workload
challenges at the Regional Office level. In this regard, although the General
Counsel has made the conduct of prompt elections a top goal over the past
ten to fifteen years, completion of backpay proceedings is a lower agency
86
priority.
2. Separating Backpay Claims that Involve Only Discharged
Employees
The previous calculations – allocating closed meritorious cases among
the Board’s six categories – were based on the entire universe of
87
meritorious backpay claims brought under sections 8(a)(3) or 8(a)(1). The
Board’s data retrieval does not distinguish backpay claims involving discharged employees from claims awarding backpay to other victims of
discrimination – such as employees who are temporarily suspended, who
are denied a promotion, or who experience a wage reduction. With assistance from the Operations-Management Division, I was able to identify all
backpay cases in which employees also were reinstated: this group by definition consists only of discharge victims. The group of other backpay
recipients – for which charge data regarding reinstatements disclosed either
a blank entry or entry of a “zero” – includes a substantial number of discharge victims who did not seek or choose to accept reinstatement, or who
were not offered it. But this latter group is a hybrid – it also includes indi85 Court judgments under this heading involved Board compliance proceedings following the
unfair labor practice decision more frequently than was the case in the “Board decisions” heading. See
supra note 84. Of the 274 charges giving rise to court judgments, sixty-three (23%) resulted in compliance decisions.
86 See, e.g., GC Memo 98-4 (1998); GC Memo 96-2 (1996) (identifying backpay compliance
cases as having a lower priority, and a longer completion period, than cases involving conduct of elections, withdrawal of recognition, surface bargaining, successorship, and other “more central” issues).
87 The universe of cases selected involved only section 8(a)(3) discharge and backpay claims that
did not also involve section 8(a)(5) allegations. See Kilpatrick E-mail, supra note 10.
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viduals whose backpay stems from a less drastic change in employment
status such as a suspension or non-promotion.
In presenting findings on the average time periods before receiving
backpay and the proportion of successful claimants who received less than
what the Board determined was due to them, I focus on the group comprised exclusively of discharged employees. When union activists or
supporters endure the “capital punishment” of job termination, their private
injuries give rise to the public policy consequences that were recognized in
Phelps Dodge but that have been less than fully addressed by the Board’s
reparative stance on backpay. By contrast, short-term job losses and pay
reductions are far less prevalent forms of employer discrimination; they
also do not implicate the Act’s core policies to nearly the same extent. As it
happens, differences between the “pure discharge” group and the hybrid
group are at times not all that substantial, and I report some results for the
88
hybrid group as well.
3. Estimating the Period from Discharge to Filing of Charge
Board data is collected and organized from the filing of a charge
forward. The period for computing backpay, however, runs from the date
of discharge forward. Discharge victims must file a charge within six
89
months of being fired, but I wanted to be more precise about the average
time from discharge to charge in our five-year period.
My research assistant, Aaron Cornell, reviewed every published Board
90
opinion involving an unlawful discharge that appeared in FY 2006. I
chose FY 2006 because it was the mid-point for the five-year period and
also because it was representative in annual terms of the number of
91
employees receiving backpay from employers during the five-year period.
The average period from discharge to charge for these FY 2006 decisions
was thirty-one days. In the findings below, I added the thirty-one-day

88 This hybrid group is larger in numerical terms than the group of charges involving “pure discharge” victims—but it bears repeating that many backpay claims in the hybrid group involve discharges as well.
89 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2006) (specifying that Board may not issue a complaint based on
conduct occurring more than six months prior to the filing and service of the charge).
90 This effort entailed reviewing every decision appearing in all or parts of four volumes of NLRB
Decisions (345 N.L.R.B. – 348 N.L.R.B.) identifying cases involving successful discharge claims, and
then noting the dates of discharge and charge. There were ninety-two published decisions involving
unlawful discharges during the twelve-month period. For decisions that omitted either date of charge or
date of discharge, the OM Division provided almost all missing information.
91 See supra note 74 (meritorious backpay claims from employers for FY 2006 encompassed
26,824 employees, roughly one-fifth the total of 135,729 employees over the five-year period).
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figure to each of the average periods from charge to disbursement of back92
pay.
4. Caveats Regarding the Dataset
Before reporting on results in some detail, I want to emphasize that
these are preliminary findings. In collecting and coding the data, I have
93
relied on the good faith efforts of dedicated professionals at the NLRB.
During the course of data-gathering, I discovered occasional errors in data
entry as well as a few puzzling data omissions. Any systemic attempt at
entering and coding data must of course recognize the risk of human error.
The instant effort was conducted in a compressed period of weeks and
involved coding the available data in ways that differ from the Board’s
regular approach. I am extremely grateful to Board personnel for their efficiency, skill, and patience in responding to my requests on top of their ordinary duties and pressures. I am confident as to our findings, but I also am
confident that the results reported here would benefit from further
94
expansion and analysis.
One other caveat involves my decision to report findings based on
averages over the most recent five-year period. This approach reflects a
belief that any proposal for reform of current practice ought to be based on
the best available current data. At the same time, the Board’s system for
resolving meritorious backpay claims has developed over decades. The
discrete 2004-08 period is not necessarily representative of the past ten or
twenty years, much less the longer time frame. Insofar as my findings and
the related proposal are deemed useful, the Board may wish to engage in
more extensive data collection and analysis to justify or modify the recommended approach.
B.

Findings

I begin by reporting the average time period between date of discharge
and receipt of backpay for the four types of resolution that together consti-

92 This thirty-one day figure stems only from cases that involve Board decisions; no comparable
calculation was made for the meritorious backpay claims that are settled. Such a calculation would
require reviewing thousands of files addressing these unreported settlements, a task well beyond my
resources. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the number of days victims take to file a charge
for unlawful firings is materially different whether the charge is subsequently settled or litigated – that
disposition is unknown and probably unknowable at the time the charge is filed.
93 The one exception is data for estimating the period from discharge to charge, which was
initially collected and analyzed by my research assistant, Aaron Cornell. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
94 In that regard, I have not attempted to assess the findings in terms of statistical significance.
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tute some 99% of relevant charges and affected employees. I have omitted
findings that pertain to formal Board settlement and compliance with ALJ
decisions, as those two categories include a de minimis number of charges
and employees. Table 1 reports calculations for the average time period
using Board charges as the basic unit of measurement.
Table 1: Average Number of Days from Firing to Receipt
of Backpay, Based on Charges

Non-Board Settlement
Informal Settlement
Compliance with Board
Compliance with Court

Firing to Charge

Charge to Backpay

Total

31
31
31
31

239
537
1735
2612

270
568
1766
2643

These findings predictably reflect that discharge victims receive back
pay more rapidly in settlements that do not require Regional Office
approval than settlements that involve Board participation. Backpay
received following litigation takes longer, and – again not surprisingly –
this backpay is disbursed sooner in order to comply with Board decisions
than to comply with appellate court judgments. The same progression,
from shortest to longest delay periods, also exists with respect to the hybrid
charges covering both non-discharged and discharged victims of unlawful
95
discrimination.
Table 1 also discloses an enormous difference between settled and litigated claims when it comes to the time period from firing to receipt of
backpay. The average period for charges that settle ranges from nine
months (non-Board settlements) to over eighteen months (informal settlements). By contrast, the average period for charges resolved through
compliance with litigated decisions varies from nearly five years (Board
96
decisions) to over seven years (court judgments).
95

For this hybrid group, the average numbers of days are as follows:

Non-Board Settlement
Informal Settlement
Compliance with Board
Compliance with Court

Firing to Charge
31
31
31
31

Charge to Backpay
257
631
1450
2973

Total
288
692
1481
3004

96 The Board decision and court judgment categories include a relatively small number of cases
that involve litigation addressed specifically to contested backpay amounts. See supra notes 84-85
(discussing proportion of charges that result in compliance decisions). For Board decisions, removing
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Table 2 reports the average time period that affected employees wait
from date of filing a charge to date of backpay receipt. The calculation of
average time periods based on affected employees is consistently higher
than when using Board charges as the unit of measurement. Table 2 also
reports the percentage increase over the charge-to-backpay period identified
in Table 1.
Table 2: Average Number of Days from Filing Charge to Receipt
of Backpay, Based on Affected Employees

Non-Board Settlement
Informal Settlement
Compliance with Board
Compliance with Court

Charge to Backpay

Increase from Table 1

351
759
2229
3869

47% (above 239)
41% (above 537)
22% (above 1735)
48% (above 2612)

The average period from charge to backpay is substantially longer (by
22% to 48%) when calculated on a per-employee rather than a per-charge
basis. The most likely explanation is that backpay claims with large numbers of discharged employees are more complex to investigate and prosecute, and also more costly for employers. More complex and costly claims
take considerably longer to settle or to litigate, thereby raising the overall
97
average time period in each claims category. My proposal for a two-tiered
mandatory minimum backpay period relies on the findings from Table 1
rather than Table 2. This reliance avoids the risk that the proposed new
approach might be unduly influenced by the outcomes in a handful of meritorious claims involving large numbers of employees. Still, it is worth
noting that for settled backpay claims involving fired employees, the average employee owed backpay waits between thirteen months and twenty-six
months to collect wages; for claims resolved through litigation, the average
period of delay endured by affected employees ranges from 6.2 to 10.7

the charges that involve contested backpay proceedings would lower the average period for resolution
by about two months – from 1766 to 1697 days. For court judgments, omitting the charges that involve
backpay compliance proceedings would lower the average period for resolution by about eleven months
– from 2650 to 2319 days.
97 See, e.g., Point Blank Body Armor, Inc., 12-CA-22383-001: non-Board settlement; 203 employees reinstated, 638 days from charge to CCR per employee (versus average of 351 days per employee); Joy Techs. Inc., d/b/a Joy Mining Machinery, 14-CA-26571-001: informal Board settlement;
133 employees reinstated, 2071 days from charge to CCR per employee (versus average of 759 days per
employee); O’Neill Meat Co., 288 N.L.R.B. 1354 (1998): compliance with court judgment; 108 employees reinstated, 9473 days from charge to CCR per employee (versus average of 3869 days per
employee).
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98

years. These results for litigated claims suggest that the delay experienced
by the forty-four former Orlando hotel employees is far from exceptional.
In addition to identifying how long discharge victims must wait to
receive backpay, I wanted to understand what proportion of meritorious
claims – and claimants – receive less backpay than the full amount they are
owed by their employer. The full amount is what the Regional Office has
calculated should be paid, deducting for interim earnings from other
99
employers and also for any failure to mitigate. Table 3 reports the results.
Table 3: Backpay Amounts Not Fully Received

Non-Board Settlement
Informal Settlement
Compliance with Board
Compliance with Court

Percent of Charges with
Full Amount
Not Received

Percent of Employees
Not Receiving Full
Amount

17%
9%
24%
33%

20%
15%
43%
39%

Within the subset of settled claims, a somewhat higher proportion of
charges, and of affected employees, received less than the full amount owed
to them in non-Board settlements than in settlements involving Regional
Office participation. Given the Regional Office’s diminished role in monitoring and approving non-Board settlements, it seems plausible that more
employees will agree to receive a discounted return on their claims.
Table 3 also indicates that for meritorious claims resolved through litigation, two to four times as many charges (and affected employees) receive
less than the amounts owed as compared with meritorious claims that settle.
This striking difference is initially surprising, because one would assume
that Regional Offices generally become less willing to compromise as a
case moves from the settlement stage through successive aspects of litiga100
tion involving enforcement and compliance.
Upon reflection, however,
98 These figures are a composite of the numbers in the first column of Table 2 combined with the
number thirty-one, which reflects my across-the-board calculation for average time between firing and
filing of charge.
99 The Regional Office calculates this amount by using interim wage statements from discharged
employees along with other records documenting the discriminatees’ work search. See OM Memo 0854, attachments B, C and D (2008).
100 See generally Indep. Stave Co., 287 N.L.R.B. 740, 741 (1987) (discussing Board’s longstanding policy encouraging pre-litigation settlements); OM Memo 07-27 at 1-2 (2007) (acknowledging
Board policy of encouraging settlements, including assessment of whether settlement is “reasonable in
light of . . . the risks of litigating the issue and the stage of litigation”).
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the sharp increase in proportion of discharged employees receiving less
than full backpay seems attributable largely to the element of delay.
When meritorious backpay claims take five to seven years to close,
both employers and employees have likely undergone major changes in
status and outlook. Employers may have altered their corporate identity,
they may have fallen into debt or undergone bankruptcy, or they may be
less willing to provide full compensation for workers mistreated by former
management years earlier. In addition, employers unwilling to settle prior
to a Board or court decision may be more willing to resist paying 100% of
what the law says they owe. As for unlawfully discharged employees, in
the course of five or seven years a large number may have died or disappeared from the community with no forwarding address. Discharge victims
also may have become frustrated over lengthy delays and abandoned hope
or lost interest in receiving what is due to them.
Moreover, notwithstanding the Board’s interest in pressing for full
backpay amounts during litigation, delays of five to seven years will often
erode the accuracy of Board processes for calculating that backpay.
Changes in the scope or nature of an employer’s operations may result in
eliminated positions or reduced comparator hours. And over an extended
number of years, employees who have sought or found alternate jobs are
likely to experience more layoffs, voluntary quits, or out-of-work periods
that further complicate thorough recordkeeping of mitigation efforts. This
array of contingent developments presumably makes Regional Offices more
101
willing to compromise.
In terms of the amounts of backpay actually received by this not-fullycompensated subgroup, I determined that for the settled claims categories,
employees received 53% to 58% of what they were owed in the aggregate;
for the litigated claims categories, shortchanged employees received 38% to
102
43% of what was due to them in aggregate terms.
Once again, the substantially lower returns for backpay claimants in litigated cases may well be
101 Two further factors at the appellate court litigation stage likely contribute to reduced levels of
backpay. First, many circuits now have mandatory mediation programs, effectively aimed at pressuring
the parties to settle. These programs add to existing incentives for Board attorneys to discount backpay
amounts given the risk that a court may not uphold the underlying violations. Second, even when the
Board prevails on the merits, an appellate court may reduce the award to individual claimants – below
what Board attorneys or the full Board concluded was the amount due and owing – based on the court’s
view of evidence developed during the compliance process.
102 Copies of these findings are on file with the author. In order to minimize the impact of a single
case on the smaller datasets for litigated claims, I removed the largest unpaid or underpaid backpay
award from each of the two litigation claims categories. Including those two cases would decrease the
aggregate proportion paid from 43.5% to 34% (Board decisions) and from 38% to 33% (court judgments). This would leave the differential between litigated claims and settled claims even more dramatic than what I report in text.
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connected to the fact they do not receive compensation from wrongdoing
employers for five to seven years.
The last set of findings concerns differences between the proportion of
employees not receiving their full backpay amounts in the “pure discharge”
subset as opposed to the hybrid subset that also includes non-discharge
unfair labor practices. Table 4 reports these results: the left-hand column is
carried over from findings set forth in Table 3.
Table 4: Proportion of Employees Not Receiving Full Backpay Amounts

Non-Board Settlement
Informal Settlement
Compliance with Board
Compliance with Court

Discharge Victims
Subset

Hybrid Victims
Subset

20%
15%
43%
39%

3%
5%
28%
14%

For claims resolved through settlement or following a court judgment,
discrimination victims who lost their jobs are three to six times more likely
103
to receive reduced backpay than victims in the hybrid group. This hybrid
group includes a substantial number of individuals receiving backpay for
finite periods of lost time or partial wage losses but who remain employees.
It seems reasonable to infer that employers are more likely to provide a full
backpay award to employees who continue to work for them than to individuals who were fired months or years earlier and are no longer around.
That explanation suggests the need for a mandatory minimum award in
purely restorative terms with respect to discharge victims.
At the same time, the hybrid group includes many discharged individuals, at least some of whom may have received their full backpay amounts
in exchange for not insisting on or not being offered reinstatement. Conversely, a much higher proportion of individuals in the “discharge victims”

103 Discharged individuals whose claims are resolved following a Board decision are 1.5 times
more likely to receive reduced amounts than their hybrid-group counterparts. For findings in this Table,
I removed several cases involving very large numbers of employees that had a strikingly disproportionate impact on the final numbers. For instance, a single non-Board settlement claim in the hybrid group
involved 3600 employees (57% of the total number of employees in this entire category), all of whom
received their full amounts. Including that case would have reduced the hybrid subset proportion not
receiving full amounts from 3% to 1.3%. Conversely, two informal settlement cases where full amounts
of backpay were not paid involved 2002 and 1985 employees (together this represented 44% of employees in the entire category) and a third such case involved $11 million owed – 91% of the total amount
owed to employees not receiving their full amounts. Including these three cases would have increased
the hybrid subset proportion not receiving backpay from 5% to 28%.
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subset may have received less than full backpay as part of an arrangement
or deal to receive reinstatement. This explanation raises the question
whether discharge victims ought to sacrifice as much as one-half to three104
fifths of backpay amounts owed to them in order to receive a reinstatement remedy to which they are entitled. To be sure, the Supreme Court
recognized the reinstatement remedy as having special public policy
105
value. But backpay relief also serves important policy-driven objectives,
as explained in Part I, and one might be skeptical about a remedial approach
that allows such a steep reduction in backpay relief.
C.

Discussion
1. Proposal for a Two-Tiered Mandatory Minimum

A number of salient points emerge from the findings just presented.
First, discharged employees must wait a long time to receive backpay owed
them by wrongdoer employers. Second, the delay is substantially longer –
106
on average anywhere from over three times to nearly ten times as long –
when meritorious discharge claims are resolved through litigation rather
than settlement. Third, even following these considerable delays, a sizeable
number of employees receive in the aggregate one-half to three-fifths less
than the backpay amounts the Board has determined are due after
accounting for interim earnings and the responsibility to mitigate. And
finally, within this group of short-changed backpay recipients, a substantially greater proportion are in connection with claims resolved through
litigation as opposed to settlement.
The basic justification for a mandatory minimum backpay period is the
same as has been established under Transmarine. Protracted time delays
involved in employers’ disbursement of backpay owed to unlawfully fired
union supporters make it impossible to return to the status quo that existed
before the fired individuals experienced months or years of lost backpay.
As a further consequence of these extended delays, many “surviving” employees are dissuaded from voicing support for collective bargaining or for
104 See supra text accompanying note 102 (reporting that the not-fully-compensated subgroup
received 53% to 58% of amounts due in settled claims and 38% to 43% of amounts due in claims
resolved through litigation).
105 See supra text accompanying notes 47-52 (discussing Board’s determination in F.W. Woolworth
to elevate remedy of reinstatement for public policy reasons, and Court’s respect for that policy-driven
position in Seven-Up Bottling).
106 The factor of three reflects the difference between a 575-day average for informal settlements
and a 1773-day average for compliance with Board decisions. The factor of ten reflects the difference
between a 277-day average for non-Board settlements and a 2650-day average for compliance with
court judgments.
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107

their erstwhile organizing campaign. Moreover, the costs associated with
administering and litigating the remedially appropriate factor of mitigation
are in effect being subsidized by discharged employees. Because of delay,
fired workers face considerable pressure to settle for less than they are
108
owed and less than what is needed to “effectuate the policies of this Act.”
Thus, the erosion of the substantial backpay relief that the Court in Phelps
Dodge contemplated, as a result of a remedial modification that Phelps
Dodge authorized, means the core remedial objective – to eliminate the
impairment of section seven rights in the workplace – is not being achieved.
Given these circumstances, an adjustment is needed in order that “the
wrongdoer, rather than the victims of his wrongdoing, should bear the con109
sequences of his unlawful conduct.”
A mandatory minimum backpay
period would constitute such an adjustment, by creating an incentive for
employers to transmit backpay sooner than they now do, and by providing
baseline meaningful monetary relief to serve as a modest deterrent against
discriminatory discharges. Decades of research have established that
employees become disillusioned and less willing to support union organizing campaigns when they observe first-hand the unlawful yet devastating
employer response visited upon their co-workers, and then watch as no
backpay is received for years. A mandatory minimum backpay award
would send a different message to those surviving employees – that every
unlawfully fired fellow employee will receive a substantial backpay award
directly from the employer.
As for what the precise mandatory minimum period should be, the
effort to draw lines inevitably reflects some element of arbitrariness. The
basic goal is to allocate more fairly, between wronged employees and
wrongdoing employers, the considerable costs associated with Phelps
Dodge-generated remedial inquiries. In pursuing this goal, one way to explain the two-week minimum established in Transmarine is in relation to
what would have been the reasonable period of days needed to conduct and
conclude effects bargaining “in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful
110
time.” That period is unlikely to exceed five weeks and may be closer to

107 See supra note 64 and accompanying text (summarizing array of government and scholarly
studies addressing negative impact on organizing that results from unlawful discharges and lengthy
delays in resolving related claims). See generally Brudney, supra note 4, at 833-34.
108 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006). See Phelps Dodge v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 191 (1971) (requiring a
remedial approach that “pursu[es] the central clue to the Board’s powers – effectuation of the policies of
the Act”) (emphasis added).
109 Transmarine Navigation Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 389, 389 (1968) (citing to Phelps Dodge).
110 First Nat’l Maint. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681-82 (1981) (discussing specifics of duty to
bargain over the effects of a plant closing).
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111

three or four. Accordingly, the Transmarine choice of two weeks might
be viewed as compensating employee victims of bad faith employer misconduct for anywhere from two-fifths to two-thirds the period it would have
taken for the employer to avoid such misconduct.
With respect to backpay proceedings, several factors are in play besides an employer’s bad faith or intentional misconduct. During a period
that ranges on average from nine months to seven years, employees are
expected to search for alternate jobs that should reduce somewhat their
backpay losses. Moreover, Board delays after a charge is filed – in
conducting investigations, in prosecuting complaints, or in pursuing compliance – may contribute to the delayed receipt of backpay, especially for
112
claims resolved through litigation but occasionally for settled claims as
well. Thus the inferred Transmarine ratio of two-thirds to two-fifths the
period of avoidable employer misconduct may be too generous toward
employees in the instant discrimination setting, and too hard on employers.
My proposal calls for a three-month mandatory minimum with respect
to backpay claims resolved through settlement, and a one-year mandatory
minimum for claims resolved through litigation. Under this two-tiered
approach, employers who resolve meritorious backpay claims against them
through settlement would bear a minimum backpay burden covering one113
third to one-sixth the average period of time it takes to settle these claims.
Employers who resolve such backpay claims through litigation would bear
a minimum burden covering a somewhat lower proportion of the delay
period: one-fifth to one-seventh the average time period for securing pay114
ment through decisions of the Board or appellate courts.
The lower proportion for claims resolved through litigation recognizes
that the Board is more likely to contribute to delays in claims that reach the
litigation stage, as these claims involve the potential for bureaucratic
bottlenecks or inertia at the national level (before the General Counsel or
Board members) as well as in the Regional Office. The Supreme Court has
111 See, e.g., Cent. Transp. Inc. v. NLRB, 997 F.2d 1180, 1188-89 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming employer’s failure to engage in effects bargaining where union proposed series of dates over five weeks
and employer never agreed to any of them); Kirkwood Fabricators Inc. v. NLRB, 862 F.2d 1303, 130607 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming employer’s failure to engage in effects bargaining based on presumed
standard that employer should “provide a few weeks notice to his employees and bargain with them over
such things as pension fund payments, vacation pay, reference letters, extended health care benefits and
severance pay so his employees can plan their affairs”).
112 See generally NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 263-64 (1970); NLRB v.
Harding Glass Co., 500 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2007).
113 Table 1 reports that the two major settlement categories take on average nine months and over
eighteen months. A three-month minimum is one-third to one-sixth of those averages.
114 Table 1 reports that the two major litigation categories take on average 4.9 years and 7.3 years.
A one-year minimum is roughly one-fifth to one-seventh of those averages.
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made clear that the Board “is not required to place the consequences of its
own delay, even if inordinate, upon wronged employees to the benefit of
115
wrongdoing employers.” Nonetheless, the Board should be permitted to
recognize and take some account of these consequences when devising a
mandatory minimum backpay award.
At the same time, a considerably longer mandatory minimum in absolute terms is justified on several grounds for litigated backpay claims.
These grounds include the extraordinary periods of delay experienced by
employees whose claims are resolved through litigation, the substantially
higher proportion of these meritorious claimants who do not receive the full
116
amounts owed to them, and the steeper reductions in amounts actually
117
Additionally, employees who
received by this short-changed group.
remain on the job during such a prolonged period inevitably become discouraged about the law’s ability to protect and vindicate their section seven
rights. They too need to know that employers will be required to provide a
meaningful minimum payment of one year’s wages to every unlawfully
discharged co-worker. In short, this remedy is “designed to restore at least
some economic inducement for an employer to [treat union supporters] as
118
the law requires.”
2. Anticipated Concerns
This two-tiered mandatory minimum proposal will doubtless trigger a
series of questions and challenges. I cannot anticipate all such concerns nor
is there space to do full justice to the ones I have anticipated. What follows
is an effort to identify and respond briefly to a range of concerns that could
be raised.
a. It may be argued that imposing a much higher mandatory minimum
for claims resolved through litigation abridges employers’ rights to due
process by punishing employers for exercising their rights of appeal under
the NLRA. The Supreme Court has long held that the Act’s purposes are
remedial, not punitive, and that the language of section 10(c) must be read
119
The one-year minimum,
with this remedial perspective in mind.
however, is not punitive in either intent or effect. Like the remedies in
115 Rutter-Rex, 396 U.S. at 264-65 (emphasis added). It has long been understood that those
disproportionately injured by the delay are the employees who did not receive the backpay or benefits to
which they were entitled. See id. at 264 (cited with approval in Harding, 500 F.3d at 10).
116 See supra Table 4 (39% and 43% versus 20% and 15% for settled claims).
117 See supra text accompanying note 102 (reductions of 53% to 58% versus 38% to 43% for
settled claims).
118 NLRB v. Emsing’s Supermarket, Inc., 872 F.2d 1279, 1291 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussed supra
notes 69, 73 and accompanying text).
119 See Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10-12 (1940).
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Transmarine and Seven-Up Bottling, it is intended to be deterrent as well as
modestly reparative. And the impact of this one-year minimum on litigated
claims is entirely proportionate from the combined deterrent-and-reparative
standpoint. Employers who choose to contest meritorious discharge and
backpay claims through prolonged litigation incur backpay obligations for a
smaller proportion of the consequent delay period than is true for employers
who choose to settle the meritorious claims against them. Moreover, as
explained earlier, the one-year minimum applies to a group of unlawfully
fired employees who in the aggregate recover the full amounts owed them
far less often, and who are shortchanged to a far greater extent, than unlawfully terminated employees whose claims settle. In sum, the one-year minimum is justified in compensatory and deterrent terms, not as a punitive
120
measure.
b. Another possible concern is that a three-month or one-year guaranteed payment effectively rewards idleness, which is precisely what the duty
to mitigate is meant to avoid. But the mandatory minimum is intended to
complement rather than supplant the duty to mitigate. Assume, for
instance, an unlawfully fired employee who is out of work for eighteen
months before his backpay claim settles, and who makes no effort to mitigate for two-thirds of that period – twelve of the eighteen months. Under
current law, he might lose two-thirds of the amount he would otherwise
have been owed, or twelve months. Under my proposal he would receive
three months mandatory minimum and then lose two-thirds of the nonguaranteed amount, or ten of the remaining fifteen months. Admittedly, the
employee receives more backpay than he would without a mandatory minimum – that is what a guaranteed baseline payment is supposed to accomplish. But the non-mitigating employee’s payments are reduced by the
121
same proportion as is true under existing law.
c. A third criticism is that one-size-fits-all remedies based on empirically constructed averages exceed the Board’s remedial authority. The
Supreme Court, however, has held otherwise with respect to across-the-

120 To confirm that employers are not penalized for litigating backpay claims, the Board could
decide that it will not seek litigation expenses even when the employer offers a frivolous defense. See
Unbelievable Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1997). But cf. infra text accompanying notes
135-37 (discussing comparisons to Title VII).
121 An employee who is out of work for only three months before a settlement and who fails to
mitigate during the entire period would receive a three-month backpay amount that could be viewed as
rewarding idleness. But this is very unlikely to occur for two reasons. First, the average delay period of
nine to eighteen months means that settlements in three months are rare (and resolution of litigated
claims within one year even rarer!). Second, fired employees seeking backpay relief expect to be out of
a job for much longer than three months and are likely to believe that shirking from day one will
adversely affect their ability to provide for themselves and their families.
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board backpay relief. In Seven-Up Bottling, the Court approved the Board’s
122
blanket approach over the objections of various dissenting Justices. The
Court in Sure-Tan did reject a Board mandatory minimum but as the
majority explained, that Board proposal was based on a wholly speculative
assumption related to the enforcement of a separate federal law by another
123
By contrast, the instant mandatory minimum proposal
federal agency.
relies on extensive evidence of current employer practices under the NLRA
that result in substantially delayed and reduced monetary relief, combined
with decades of accumulated evidence that such delays undermine the
effectuation of core policies under the Act. Moreover, with respect to reliance on statistical averaging, the proposal uses established techniques for
estimating averages, an approach the NLRB and courts have approved
124
when devising backpay remedies.
d. A fourth and related criticism is that a blanket mandatory minimum
does not allow for exceptions. I anticipate at least one exception for discrimination victims who also are undocumented immigrants. This is a
group with no rights to backpay under the Supreme Court’s decision in
125
Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB. Exceptions based on other independently unlawful employee conduct may also deserve consideration.
e. A fifth concern is whether a mandatory minimum is needed at all
for settled cases when 80 to 85% of employees are receiving their full
126
backpay amounts. There are at least two responses to this concern. One is
that the 15 to 20% of wrongfully discharged employees who settle for less
than what they are entitled to receive constitute a sizeable portion of the
relevant population. Addressing their legitimate claims is important, especially given that these employees receive less than three-fifths of what they
127
are owed. Additionally, even the 80 to 85% receiving what is due to them
122

See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
124 See, e.g., CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 12, § 10592.5 (authorizing use of statistical
sampling to approximate gross backpay when settling cases involving large numbers of discriminatees
or long periods of backpay owed); GC Memo 02-04 (2002) (codifying use of statistical sampling in
informal settlements and as a basis for compliance specifications and supplemental litigation); Great
Lakes Chem. Corp., 323 N.L.R.B. 749 (1997) (approving use of averages to estimate number of discriminates entitled to recover backpay, and relying on wage rates paid to representative employees when
computing backpay); Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 317 N.L.R.B. 588 (1995), enforced, 83 F.3d 432
(10th Cir. 1996) (approving use of averaging of total overtime worked in order to compute lost wages);
see also NLRB v. S.E. Nichols of Ohio, 704 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1983); Performance Friction Corp., 335
N.L.R.B. 1117 (2001) (approving “representative employee” formulas as basis for computing gross
backpay awards). See generally Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 547 F.3d 742, 748 (7th Cir. 2008)
(Posner, J.).
125 Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
126 See supra Table 3.
127 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
123
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do not get paid for thirteen to twenty-six months following their dis128
Those payments occur long after most organizing drives have
charge.
ended, at a time when they can do little to restore employees’ belief that the
Board is able to protect section seven rights. In short, there are major unmet
needs related to the absence of a mandatory minimum in settled cases.
f. A sixth concern is that administering the mandatory minimum will
create undue burdens on an agency struggling to apply its remedial backpay
authority. The Board already has had to develop almost-encyclopedic
guidelines to govern backpay relief, and this proposal represents at most a
small addition. If anything, the proposal will alleviate some of the Board’s
administrative burdens, by simplifying backpay calculations in many
instances and by encouraging employers to reduce the time period for re129
solving backpay disputes.
g. A final concern is that if the mandatory minimum is valuable, it
ought to be used for backpay claims against unions as well. Unlawful
union conduct at times results in employees being discriminated against and
130
losing pay, and some version of the mandatory minimum award should
presumably apply to union wrongdoers in those settings. At the same time,
Board data indicates that 99% of backpay recipients in the past five years
131
have been victims of unlawful conduct by employers, not unions. If this
proposal is adopted or developed by the Board, data on union misconduct
and backpay relief that is subsequently collected and analyzed may form
the basis for comparable minimum backpay requirements.
D.

Broadening Perspectives and Augmenting Resources

In addition to the proposal for a mandatory minimum award set forth
in this Part, I suggest the Board may want to take a fresh look at how it
administers and enforces back pay relief. The Board’s approach on mitigation has been in place for six decades and has served as a model for other

128

See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
For example, the Board could make the mandatory minimum payable immediately upon settlement or at the time of a Board decision in the underlying unfair labor practice case. If the Regional
Office determines (in litigated cases) that a discriminatee is entitled to more than the minimum, full
backpay litigation might follow. This would avoid the problem of discharge victims having to wait
through years of compliance investigations and proceedings before receiving any monetary relief.
130 See, e.g., NLRB & Int’l Ass’n of Ironworkers, Local 480, 466 U.S. 720 (1984).
131 For the five year period, 135,729 employees overall received backpay from employers, and –
with one highly unusual exception – 1874 employees overall received backpay from unions. The exception was a single informal settlement in FY 2006 in which 2584 individuals received a total payment of
$12,377 (an average of $4.79 per employee). If this one settlement (which covers more employees than
all other union backpay charges combined in our five-year period) were included, the ratio of backpay
recipients from employers would be 97% instead of 99%.
129
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federal statutes adopting a duty to mitigate, notably Title VII. The Board
also has recognized some connection between its own standards and the
mitigation practices under state laws that determine eligibility for unem133
ployment insurance (UI) benefits. Pursuant to detailed Board guidelines
and practices, unlawfully discharged employees are expected to make
134
The two
reasonable efforts to search for substantially equivalent work.
core issues, therefore, are what qualifies as substantially equivalent work
and what satisfies the requirement to conduct a reasonable job search.
Over the years, the Board has not seriously examined either Title VII
or state UI statutes to determine whether their parallel provisions offer any
useful insights as to when available interim employment is substantially
equivalent and what qualifies as a reasonable job search. Given that the
Board’s approach to backpay and mitigation is viewed by many observers
as excessively delayed, unduly contentious, and bureaucratically onerous, it
might be valuable – or at least prudent – to consider what lessons can be
learned from other statutory schemes. My purpose here is not to offer specific recommendations but rather to suggest in illustrative terms why these
parallel statutory schemes warrant more attention.
For example, Title VII caselaw may offer useful insights regarding
what is considered substantially equivalent work. Many circuits have interpreted this phrase narrowly to mean that an interim employment option
must provide the discriminatee with “virtually identical promotional opportunities, compensation, job responsibilities, working conditions and status”
135
as the position from which she was terminated.
Further, when an
employee takes an inferior job on an interim basis to help make ends meet,
she is not obligated to remain in that job during the pendency of her

132 See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982) (borrowing liberally from NLRA
policies and caselaw in analyzing discriminatees’ duty to mitigate under § 706(g) of Civil Rights Act);
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975) (discussing how the make-whole purpose of
Title VII backpay relief was “expressly modeled on the backpay provision of the National Labor Relations Act”).
133 See generally Jackson Hosp. Corp., No. S 9-CA-37734, 2008 WL 544882 (NLRB Div. of
Judges, Feb. 26, 2008), aff’d, 354 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 10 (2009), petition for review filed D.C.
Cir. No. 09-1203 (July 14, 2009) (citing Superior Protection Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. at 3
(2006); Birch Run Welding, 286 N.L.R.B. 1316, 1319 (1987)).
134 See CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 12, § 10558.3; GC Memo 09-01 (2008) at 5-7 (discussing elements of proof regarding substantially equivalent available jobs); id. at 7-9 (discussing burden of production that discriminatee conducted a reasonable job search).
135 Vaughan v. Sabine County, No. 03-41216, 2004 WL 1683099 (5th Cir. 2004) (slip op. at 3)
(emphasis added); see also Sellers v. Delgado Cmty. Coll., 839 F.2d 1132, 1138 (5th Cir. 1988); Rasimas
v. Mich. Dep’t of Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614, 624 (6th Cir. 1982); Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, 922 F.2d
1515, 1527 (11th Cir. 1991); Booker, III v. Taylor Milk Co., 64 F.3d 860, 866 (3d Cir. 1995).
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claim. Importantly, a discriminatee entitled to backpay under Title VII is
not required to go into another line of work, or to take a demeaning position
137
Board guidance addressing the duty to mitigate is more
or a demotion.
equivocal on this point, suggesting that a discriminatee is “not normally
138
required to accept lower-paying employment.” It seems worth exploring
whether these Title VII decisions and others addressing mitigation reflect a
more protective and less burdensome overall stance toward victims of discrimination than has developed under Board doctrine. If so, the result
would be somewhat ironic – and perhaps deserving of consideration by the
Board – given that Title VII used the NLRA as its original model.
A related empirical question is whether backpay claims under Title VII
are subject to extended, closely contested litigation less often than they are
under the NLRA. It seems at least plausible that employers’ resistance to
backpay awards is not as prolonged or intense under a statute that awards
139
attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party. Unlike the text of Title
VII, section 10(c) of the NLRA makes no provision for the award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party, and Board authority to recover litigation
140
costs has been questioned by appellate courts. The Board, however, may
well retain inherent authority to pursue such costs under the bad faith ex141
ception to the American Rule. If Title VII backpay claims are being resolved more promptly and less contentiously due at least in part to the risk
of attorney’s fee awards in favor of already-prevailing claimants, the Board
may wish to consider more frequent pursuit of litigation costs against
employers whose conduct is intended to stall or frustrate the compliance
process.
A second, separate area of inquiry involves state law practices under
the UI system that may shed relevant light on what constitutes a suitably
136 See Sellers, 839 F.2d at 1137 (relying on Supreme Court’s holding in Ford Motor Co. that a
Title VII claimant is under no obligation to accept non comparable employment in the first instance, and
therefore cannot be required to stay in any such non comparable position).
137 See Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, 753 F.2d 1269, 1274-75 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing Ford Motor
Co., 458 U.S. at 231).
138 CASEHANDLING MANUAL, supra note 12, § 10558.3; GC Memo 09-01 (2008) at p. 9 (emphasis
added); see also Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 232 n.16 (citing appeals court decisions from 1950s suggesting that under NLRA law, claimants must consider taking a lower-paying position after seeking
work without success for an extended period).
139 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2006).
140 See Quick v. NLRB, 245 F.3d 231, 256-57 (3d Cir. 2001); Unbelievable Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d
795, 800-06 (D.C. Cir. 1997). But cf. id. at 806-12 (Wald, J., dissenting).
141 See Unbelievable Inc., 118 F.3d at 800, 809 (leaving open the issue of Board’s inherent
authority); Alwin Mfg. Co., 326 N.L.R.B. 646 (1998), enforced, 192 F.3d 133, 142-44 & n.13 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (awarding litigation costs against employer); see also Teamsters Local Union No.122, 334
N.L.R.B. 1190, 1193-95 (2001) (awarding litigation expenses against union based on bad faith during
bargaining and continuing bad faith during litigation of § 8(b)(3) claim).
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diligent job search. Under recently promulgated Board guidelines, once it
is clear that substantially equivalent jobs are available, the General Counsel
has the burden to produce evidence of a reasonable job search by the back142
The Board on a number of occasions has held that a
pay claimant.
wrongfully discharged employee’s receipt of unemployment benefits is
143
“corroborative of reasonable efforts to seek interim employment.”
Beyond what is corroborative, however, should the Board consider
borrowing from certain UI job search standards as part of an effort to simplify its approach on this issue? When meeting its burden of production,
what actions, if any, ought the Board to require of a backpay claimant
besides registering at a UI office, meeting periodically with UI staff, and
144
submitting a weekly record of contacts with possible employers? When
unemployed discharge victims take short vacations or enroll in training
courses, should such temporary hiatuses from the job search process be at
145
all probative of lack of reasonable diligence? If, as seems likely, agency
and court review of the job search process is less time-consuming and fractious in the UI setting than under Board practice, should the NLRB take a
closer look at these state practices? As with Title VII, evidence that UI
processes are more efficient and less onerous for claimants would be
somewhat ironic. Why should government-administered proceedings under
the NLRA tolerate or effectively encourage greater obstacles to recovery for
meritorious claimants who are victims of intentional misconduct by their
former employers than occurs in government-administered proceedings for
UI applicants whose former employers are not wrongdoers under the law?
Finally, in addition to seriously examining how mitigation operates in
similar statutory settings, the Board should strongly consider efforts to seek
and expend greater resources in the backpay compliance area. For too
many years, backpay proceedings have been regarded as of minimal
importance in the Board’s remedial and policy framework. Memos from
the General Counsel establish that securing rapid elections, addressing successorship challenges, or resolving surface bargaining complaints are opera142 See St. George Warehouse, 351 N.L.R.B. 961, 961 (2007); GC Memo 09-01 (2008) at 7. The
employer retains the ultimate burden of proof that the claimant’s search was not reasonably diligent.
143 Jackson Hosp. Corp., No. S 9-CA-37734, 2008 WL 544882 (NLRB Div. of Judges, Feb. 26,
2008), aff’d, 354 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 10 (2009), petition for review filed D.C. Cir. No. 09-1203
(July 14, 2009). See, e.g., Superior Prot., Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. 1197, 1198 (2006) (holding that receipt of
UI benefits constitutes “prima facie evidence of a reasonable search”); Birch Run Welding, 286
N.L.R.B. 1316, 1319 (1987) (same); Midwest Motel Mgmt. Corp., 278 N.L.R.B. 421, 422-23 (1986)
(same).
144 See generally SAMUEL ESTREICHER & GILLIAN LESTER, EMPLOYMENT LAW 150 (2008); U.S.
DEPT. OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT TRAINING ADMIN., COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT LAWS, ch.
5 (non-monetary eligibility) (2009) (copy on file with author).
145 See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 850 (3d ed. 2005).
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tional priorities whereas backpay compliance proceedings are backburner
items – relegated to second class status if substantial amounts of money are
146
at stake and third class status if only modest amounts are involved. This
neglect of backpay claims is unlikely to change unless additional resources
are allocated by Congress to the Board, or re-allocated by the Board within
147
its current budget.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the labor law community is well aware, Congress has made no substantial changes to the NLRA for over half a century. Prolonged congressional inaction has left the NLRB as the default channel for those seeking to
revise or update labor relations policy. It would be understandable if
partisan pressures on the Board – resulting inter alia from an increasingly
148
politicized appointments process – have made the agency less willing to
consider or initiate adjustments in the use of its existing powers. What is
understandable, however, is not necessarily justifiable.
This Article has focused on backpay claims for wrongful discharge
and their significance in effectuating the core policies of the Act. The Court
has long made clear that the Board as expert agency has broad discretion
when designing and adjusting its remedial powers. In the area of backpay,
the Board has the authority to do more than it has done. A mandatory minimum award for wrongfully discharged employees is an important way the
Board can move forward, using existing effects-bargaining precedent as a
model while invoking the reasoning of Phelps Dodge and its progeny. By
adopting a properly modulated and adequately justified mandatory
minimum, the Board can help make backpay claims a more meaningful
element of the Board’s policymaking responsibilities. This type of remedial
adjustment is overdue.

146

See GC Memo 98-4 (1998); GC Memo 96-2 (1996); see also supra note 86.
The Obama Administration’s FY 2011 NLRB budget request includes a very small overall
increase of 1.3%. See Susan J. McGolrick, Proposed Budget for FY 2011 Includes Modest Increases for
NLRB, FMCS, NMB, 20 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at AA-6 (Feb. 2, 2010). Accordingly, resource increases may need to come from elsewhere within existing Board allocations.
148 See generally Brudney, supra note 4, at 243-52; Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor
Board: The Transformation of the NLRB 1953-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2000).
147

